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To enable effective interaction with the environment, the brain
combines noisy sensory information with expectations based on
prior experience. There is ample evidence showing that humans
can learn statistical regularities in sensory input and exploit this
knowledge to improve perceptual decisions and actions. However,
fundamental questions remain regarding how priors are learned
and how they generalise to different sensory and behavioural con-
texts. In principle, maintaining a large set of highly speciﬁc priors
may be inefﬁcient and restrict the speed at which expectations
can be formed and updated in response to changes in the envi-
ronment. On the other hand, priors formed by generalising across
varying contexts may not be accurate. Here we exploit rapidly
induced contextual biases in duration reproduction to reveal how
these competing demands are resolved during the early stages of
prior acquisition. We show that observers initially form a single
prior by generalising across duration distributions coupled with
distinct sensory signals. In contrast, they form multiple priors if
distributions are coupled with distinct motor outputs. Together,
our ﬁndings suggest that rapid prior acquisition is facilitated by
generalisation across experiences of different sensory inputs, but
organised according to how that sensory information is acted
upon.
Bayesian inference | Time perception | Sensorimotor learning
Like all complex animals, humans rely on their senses to
extract information about the environment and guide decision
making and behaviour. Often however, sensory information is
ambiguous. Signals transmitted to the senses can be weak or
degraded, such as patterns of reflected light under low illumina-
tion or speech sounds in noisy environments. Moreover, sensory
representations of even the most high-fidelity signals tend to
be variable (1) and are insufficient to completely disambiguate
different distal causes (2). Mounting empirical evidence indicates
that when forming decisions and planning actions, the brain
combines uncertain sensory information with expectations based
on prior knowledge (3-6). For example, a variety of biases in visual
perception have been shown to be consistent with reliance on
prior knowledge regarding statistical regularities in the environ-
ment, such as the distribution of local orientations (7) and speeds
(8) in natural scenes and the positioning of light sources (9). In
many studies, perception and behaviour have been shown to be
well described by near-optimal integration of sensory evidence
and prior knowledge according to the principles of statistical
decision theory.
Prior knowledge can be acquired over a range of different
timescales. Priors specifying stable statistical characteristics of the
environment are typically thought to be either innate or the con-
sequence of life-long implicit learning (5,7). However, context-
specific priors can also be formed based on recent experiences.
Studies using simple sensorimotor tasks suggest that human par-
ticipants are adept at learning the distribution of sets of stimuli
and integrating this acquired knowledge with sensory evidence
when making decisions and planning actions (e.g. 4, 10-13). For
example, a classic finding in temporal reproduction experiments
is that judgments converge towards a central value - participants
consistently overestimate shorter durations and underestimate
longer ones (14-15). The centre of convergence at which there
is no constant reproduction error (termed the ‘indifference point’)
is not fixed, but rather shifts depending on the set of durations
presented (16-17). Recent studies have demonstrated that these
central tendency biases can be parsimoniously explained by the
integration of noisy sensory estimates with acquired knowledge
of the stimulus distribution in a manner that maximises repro-
duction precision (17-19).
Considerable advances have been made toward understand-
ing how priors are learned and updated over time (20-23) and
the degree of complexity in stimulus distributions that can be
represented (19, 23-25). However, our understanding of how
prior knowledge is organised by the brain remains limited. Re-
cent research indicates that participants provided with extended
training are able to learn multiple priors for stimuli presented
in different contexts. For example, Kerrigan and Adams (26)
demonstrated that distinct light position priors can be learned
for different coloured illumination in a few hours. Similarly,
Gekas and colleagues (24) showed that distinct priors for motion
direction can be learned for sets of dot stimuli of different colours.
Multiple prior learning has also been demonstrated using stimu-
lus sets demarcated by way of spatial location (27) and symbolic
visual cues (28), suggesting that sensory specificity may be a key
organising principle for representations of prior knowledge.
In principle, maintaining high levels of prior specificity should
ensure that expectations about different objects and events in
the external environment remain accurate, even when they are
characterised by distinct statistical properties. However, applica-
tion of this strategy in complex real-world environments poses
fundamental challenges. In a typical sensorimotor experiment,
subjects are presented with stimuli that vary along a small number
of dimensions and asked to perform a single task. In contrast,
Signiﬁcance
When sensory information is uncertain, humans rely on prior
knowledge of the environment whenmaking perceptual judg-
ments and planning actions. Humans can rapidly learn new
priors, but the rules governing how recent experiences are
grouped together are unknown. Here we show that observers
initially form single priors by generalising across distinct sen-
sory signals, but form multiple priors when they are coupled
with different motor outputs. Thus, our results reveal that
internal models of temporal statistics are initially organised
not according to the nature of the sensory input, but the way
it is acted upon.
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Fig. 1. Rapidly induced central tendency biases in human and Bayesian
model observers. (A)Mean reproduction durations as a function of stimulus
duration (ﬁlled symbols) for six stimulus distributions presented in separate
testing blocks. Error bars show ±1SEM calculated across observers. Solid lines
show best ﬁtting power functions for each dataset, whereas the dotted
diagonal line denotes veridical (unbiased) performance. Unﬁlled symbols
in this and subsequent ﬁgures represent the estimated indifference points
(centre of compressive bias) along with bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence in-
tervals. (B) Mean compression magnitude (1 - power exponent), plotted
as a function of duration range (error bars show 95% CIs). The color of
data points indicates associated conditions in Figure 1A and 1B. The right
hand ordinate scale shows the ratioof prior standard deviation to likelihood
standard deviation (both log-scaled) required to produce equivalent levels
of bias in the Bayesian model. (C) Estimated indifference points as a function
of the mean duration for a given stimulus distribution (error bars show 95%
CIs). The solid horizontal line indicates the global mean calculated across all
conditions. (D) Simulated data for a Bayesian observer-actor that combines
sensory evidence with acquired knowledge of the stimulus distribution (for
details see Supporting Information). Inset distributions represent inferred
approximations of the prior distribution for each condition (see Supporting
Information for more details).
people encounter a wide range of sensory inputs outside the
laboratory and use this information to interact with the environ-
ment in a variety of ways. Trying to learn a specific prior for
every combination of stimulus and behavioural context would be
unfeasible, since no two situations are ever identical. Moreover,
increased specificity in prior representations has the negative
side-effect of limiting the rate at which priors can be learned and
updated in response to changes in the environment.
Here we exploit central tendency biases in duration repro-
duction to investigate how these competing demands are resolved
during the early stages of prior acquisition. We first demonstrate
that individuals can rapidly form priors that approximate the
distribution of stimulus durations presented within a single test-
ing session. To reveal the rules governing the initial structuring
of prior knowledge, we then interleave stimuli from duration
distributions that result in distinct central-tendency biases when
presented in separate sessions. Across a series of experiments, we
manipulate the sensory characteristics of each set of stimuli as
well as the nature of the motor response required.
Results
Rapidly induced central tendency biases in duration reproduc-
tion.
Observers were asked to reproduce the duration of a simple
visual stimulus (isotropicGaussian patch) by pressing and holding
a key for an equivalent interval of time. Within each 70-trial
testing block, stimuli were presented for one of 7 different du-
rations, sampled from a log-uniform distribution. Filled symbols
in Figure 1A show mean reproduction durations for six different
distributions of varying range and central tendency. Compared to
the dashed diagonal lines denoting veridical performance, clear
evidence of a compressive bias can be seen in each condition. To
summarise the pattern of biases observed, we fitted each dataset
with a power function and derived two statistics: the magnitude
of the compressive bias (1 minus the exponent of the power
function) and the indifference point (the duration at which the
fitted power function intersects the diagonal, see Supporting In-
formation for details). Both metrics were systematically affected
by short-term manipulation of the stimulus distribution, albeit in
different ways. The magnitude of compression was dependent on
the variability of durations presented within a given testing block,
with greater mean compression observed for smaller duration
ranges than larger ones (Figure 1B). Indifference points were
pulled towards the mean duration encountered in the associated
testing block (Figure 1C).
In keeping with recent suggestions (18-19), we found that
these biases can be well described by a Bayesian ideal observer
model in which acquired knowledge of the stimulus distribu-
tion is used to support inferences made about stimulus duration
when available sensory measurements are imprecise. Rather than
learning the discrete physical stimulus distribution, we assumed
that observers acquire a smoothed approximation of the distri-
bution (see Supporting Information). Figure 1D shows simulated
datasets for each duration distribution condition, along with the
best-fitting priors. Differences in the magnitude of compression
between conditions are captured by a change in the width of the
prior, consistent with previous evidence showing that observers
can implicitly learn the variance of a stimulus distribution (22-
23, 29). Changes in the indifference point are consistent with a
lateral shift in the prior distribution towards recently presented
stimulus values. While extensive training can result in priors that
accurately approximate the stimulus distribution (17), the limited
opportunity afforded by each of our brief testing blocks resulted
in partial prior recalibration - note how indifference points fall
close to the mid-point between the mean of the relevant duration
distribution and that of the entire stimulus set. Critically however,
the fact that quantifiable changes in the pattern of bias can
be induced over this short timescale provides us with a means
of probing the characteristics of the underlying prior-updating
mechanisms.
Generalisation across distributions paired with distinct sen-
sory inputs.
To investigate generalisation during rapid prior formation, we
took the approach of interleaving stimuli drawn from duration
distributions that produce distinct patterns of reproduction bias
when presented in separate blocks. The filled black symbols
in Figure 2A show mean duration reproductions for two such
stimulus sets, which have been replotted from the left panel
of Figure 1A. Indifference points for these short (S) and long
(L) duration distributions are significantly different (open black
symbols), confirming that prior expectations differed between
testing blocks. A contrasting pattern of results was obtained when
the two distributions were randomly intermixed within a testing
block (red symbols). Interleaving increased the overestimation
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Fig. 2. .Generalisation across interleaved duration
distributions. (A) Stimulus durations sampled from
short (S) and long (L) distributions were either pre-
sented in blocks (black) or randomly interleaved (red).
Interleaving altered the pattern of biases, produc-
ing a convergence of indifference points (unﬁlled
symbols) towards a common duration. (B) Simulated
performance of the Bayesian observer-actormodel for
blocked (black) and interleaved (red) conditions. In
the interleaved condition, a singular prior distribution
was implemented by generalising across both stimulus
distributions.
Fig. 3. . Rapidly learned priors generalise acrossdistributions paired withdis-
tinctsensory inputs.(A)Mean reproduced durations for interleaved presenta-
tion in which short (S) and long (L) distributions were presented at different
locations and alternated from trial-to-trial to remove spatial and temporal
uncertainty (red symbols). For comparison black symbols show data obtained
when stimulus distributions were presented in separate blocks (replotted
from Figure 1A). (B) Mean reproduced durations of visual (circular symbols)
and auditory (triangular symbols) under blocked (black) and alternated(red)
presentation conditions. Error bars for mean reproductions show ±1SEM,
whereas error bars for indifference points show bootstrapped 95% CIs.
bias in reproduction of short durations and underestimation bias
in long durations, resulting in indifference points which converge
towards a point of central tendency for the combined stimulus
range. These results are consistent with the formation of a single
composite prior distribution, and can be parsimoniously modeled
using the same prior as previously inferred from results with a
wide continuous duration range (Figure 2B). This convergence
of indifference points provides a useful marker of when prior
formation generalises across the two interleaved stimulus sets;
if observers formed separate priors for each stimulus set, no
difference in the pattern of biases would be expected between
blocked and interleaved conditions.
Since observers did not have ameans of distinguishing the dif-
ferent stimulus sets in the random interleaving condition, it per-
haps unsurprising that acquired prior expectations were formed
by generalising across them. Interestingly however, we found that
the same pattern of results holds even if the stimuli used for the
two interleaved duration distributions are clearly discriminable.
Figure 3A shows results obtained when short and long visual
stimuli where presented at different spatial locations (left and
right of fixation) and alternated from trial to trial to remove
any spatial and temporal uncertainty regarding set membership.
Despite these changes to the stimulus sequence, indifference
points in the interleaved condition again converged towards a
common central duration, suggesting that observers’ prior expec-
tations did not distinguish between the two clearly demarcated
stimulus sets. Even more striking evidence for generalisation
across stimulus type was found when sets of visual and auditory
stimuli were interleaved within a single session. As shown in
Figure 3B, reproduction of short visual (circular symbols) and
long auditory (triangular symbols) produced compressive biases
around distinct indifference points when tested in separate blocks
(black symbols), but converged towards a common point when al-
ternated within a single testing session (red symbols). This finding
demonstrates that observers do not automatically form separate
priors for stimuli presented to different sensory modalities.
To confirm the statistical robustness of the results in Fig-
ures 2 and 3, we computed participants’ mean reproduction
times across the seven durations in each duration range and
carried out a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA. In each case
we found a significant interaction between presentation condi-
tion (blocked or interleaved) and duration range (short or long)
(Random interleaving: F(1,8)=17.75, p<0.05; Spatial segrega-
tion/alternation: F(1,8)=13.84, p<0.05); Bimodal alternation:
F(1,8)=9.47, p<0.05). Decomposition of these significant inter-
actions into simple effects revealed that interleaving significantly
increased reproduction times for the short range condition in
each experiment (see Table S1). Interleaving had a more modest,
contracting effect on reproduction times in the long range, which
reached statistical significance in one of the three conditions.
Together, these results demonstrate a clear tendency for rapidly
acquired duration priors to generalise across different stimulus
types, even when they are clearly discriminable and are charac-
terised by distinct temporal statistics.
Our results differ from previous studies, where participants
have been shown to acquire stimulus-specific priors when pro-
vided with more extensive training (24, 26-27). To check that
this also occurs in our experimental paradigm, we conducted an
additional experiment in which observers completed repeated
testing sessions with alternative presentation of short and long
stimulus sets at different spatial locations (Figure 4A). In early
sessions (red symbols), biases converged towards a common cen-
tral duration, replicating the reliance on a single, generalised
prior in Figure 3A. However, indifference points systematically
diverged with further training (blue symbols), consistent with the
gradual employment of stimulus-specific priors over time. This
transition is clearly illustrated in Figure 4B, which plots changes
in the ratio of indifference points for short and long stimulus sets
over the course of testing.
No generalisation across distributions paired with different
motor responses
In striking contrast to the results obtained when interleaving
different stimulus types, we found no evidence of prior generalisa-
tion when stimulus sets were paired with different types of motor
response. Figure 5A shows results obtained when observers were
only required to make a duration reproduction for one of the two
interleaved stimulus sets. Short and long visual stimuli were alter-
natively presented to the left and right of fixation and observers
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Fig. 4. Emergence of stimulus-speciﬁcity with extended training. (A) Observers were required to manually reproduce the duration of short (S) and long
(L) visual stimuli presented alternatively to the right and left of ﬁxation. Each observer completed 8 sessions, each comprising 140 trials. Mean reproduced
durations in the ﬁrst session (red ﬁlled symbols) replicate the pattern of compressive bias shown in Figure 3A. Indifference points (unﬁlled red symbols) for the
two duration distributions converge towards a common duration, consistent with reliance on a single generalised prior. However by the ﬁnal session, mean
reproduced durations for short and long stimuli (blue ﬁlled symbols) were compressed around distinct indifference points (blue unﬁlled symbols). Error bars
for mean reproductions show ±1SEM, whereas error bars for indifference points show bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals. (B) Ratio of indifference points
for short and long duration distributions, plotted as a function of testing session. The systematic divergence of indifference points suggests that observers’
prior expectations become increasingly location-speciﬁc over time. Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Fig. 5. .Rapidly learned priors distinguish between distributions paired with different motor responses.(A)Mean reproduction durations for short (S) and long
(L) distributions when presented in separate blocks (black symbols) or when reproduction trials for one stimulus set were alternated with passive presentation
of the other stimulus set (red symbols). In contrast to the data shown in Figure 2, there is no systematic convergence of indifference points (open symbols)
in the interleaved condition. (B) The left panel shows mean reproduction durations for a control experiment in which reproduction trials for one stimulus
set were alternated with trials requiring binary duration discrimination judgments on the other stimulus set (red symbols). For comparison black symbols
show reproduction data obtained when short and long duration distributions were presented in separate blocks. The right panel shows the group-mean
psychometric functions for the binary judgments trials, along with the best-ﬁtting logistic functions. The proportion of trials on which stimuli were judged to
be longer than the mean duration of the stimulus set is plotted as a function of stimulus duration. (C)Mean reproduced durations using button press (circular
symbols) and vocalisation (square symbols) methods, measured in separate blocks (black symbols) or interleaved presentation (red symbols). Error bars for
mean reproductions and binary choice probability show ±1SEM, whereas error bars for indifference points show bootstrapped 95% CIs.
were instructed to reproduce the duration of stimuli presented on
one side, whilst passively observing stimuli presented at the other
spatial location. Reproduction data for both short and long dura-
tion distributions was obtained by reversing the mapping between
spatial location and response in different sessions. Despite the
stimulus sequences being identical to that described previously
(e.g. Figure 3A), biases obtained in interleaved conditions were
indistinguishable from those obtained with blocked presentation
(condition x duration range interaction: F(1,8)=0.60, p>0.05, see
Table S2). This result demonstrates that prior formation is not a
simple function of sensory history. Rather, it is only the set of
previously reproduced stimuli that determines observers’ prior
expectations on subsequent reproduction trials; passive trials do
not contribute.
A potential limitation of asking observers to passively view
a set of stimuli is that it is difficult to know with any certainty
how well these stimuli were attended. To address this concern, we
conducted a control experiment in which observers made binary
judgments about the duration of stimuli presented to one side
of fixation (‘is this stimulus shorter or longer than the average
duration seen at that location?’), alternated with reproductions of
the duration of stimuli presented to the other. As shown in Figure
5B, responses on binary judgment trials were sufficient to allow
construction of systematic psychometric functions for duration
discrimination, confirming that observers attending to the non-
reproduced stimuli, forming estimates of stimulus duration and
maintaining an accurate internal representation of the mean. As
was the case for passive presentation however, the duration of
these stimuli did not systematically impact upon the pattern of bi-
ases in interleaved reproduction trials (condition x duration range
interaction: F(1,8)=0.99, p>0.05). Thus, we can be confident that
the lack of generalisation across stimulus sets reflects the fact that
they were paired with different types of response.
To further test the limits of response-specificity during rapid
prior formation, we also investigated the effects of interleaving
duration reproduction trials requiring different motor responses.
Observers were asked to reproduce the duration of some stimuli
by making a vocal utterance (‘ba’) into a microphone for a cor-
responding length of time. The duration of speech segments was
extracted from audio recordings of each trial using an automated
speech detection algorithm (see Experimental Procedures). As
shown in Figure 5C, the duration of observers’ vocal reproduc-
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tions (square symbols) showed compressive biases in blocked
conditions comparable to those observed with button press re-
sponses (circular symbols). In interleaved conditions (red sym-
bols), observers reproduced the stimulus duration on every trial,
but alternated between vocal and keypress methods (paired with
stimuli presented to the left and right of fixation respectively).
Again, we found no systematic difference in the pattern of biases
observed with blocked and interleaved presentation (condition
x duration range interaction: F(1,8)=0.26, p>0.05), indicating
an absence of generalisation across experiences of stimuli paired
with different types of reproduction response. This experimental
result is important for two reasons. First, it indicates that it is not
simply the types of judgement made by observers that is critical
for driving response-specificity in prior expectations, but also the
specific motor actions involved in executing those judgements. It
also provides a strong demonstration that observers concurrently
maintain multiple motor-specific priors in interleaved conditions
because, unlike passive and binary discrimination experiments,
reproduction data for both short and long duration distributions
was collected within the same session.
Discussion
Generalisation is an essential ingredient in the formation of prior
expectations within complex environments. In everyday life we
encounter a diverse range of sensory stimuli, making it impos-
sible to learn statistical regularities without grouping experiences
together in somemeaningful way. Our results indicate that recent
experiences of stimulus duration are initially routed into sepa-
rate prior representations not according to the type of sensory
input, but according to the way in which observers act upon this
input. Observers consistently formed single priors by generalising
across stimulus distributions with distinct statistics, even when
they were clearly distinguished by way of spatial location, tem-
poral sequence or sensory modality. We propose that this broad
generalisation across sensory inputs is a default mode which acts
to widen the data acquisition ‘net’ for initial prior acquisition,
allowing approximations of stimulus distributions to be rapidly
learned and modified. This strategy is not fixed however - in line
with previous findings (24, 26-27), we find that observers are able
to learn stimulus-specific priors with extended training. Together,
this work indicates that the structuring of prior knowledge is
dynamic and that emphasis shifts from flexibility to specificity as
learning progresses. Characterising the dynamics of this transi-
tion provides a challenge for future behavioural studies, as well
as computational models describing how priors are learned and
updated over time (20-23). An appealing idea is that the brain
performs a type of cluster analysis, partitioning sensory inputs
into groups with different statistical properties. The emergence
of prior specificity may reflect the accumulation of sufficient
evidence to justify clustering.
In contrast to the generalisation observed across different
sensory inputs, interval duration priors appear to be specific
to motor response from the outset of learning. We found no
evidence of generalisation across passive and active trials, trials
requiring different forms of duration judgement, or trials requir-
ing reproduction judgements involving different motor systems.
In these experiments, we were careful to use identical stimulus
sequences to those that produced generalisationwhen pairedwith
a consistent manual reproduction response. Accordingly, we can
be confident that the dissociation between stimulus and response
generalisation is not an artefact of changes in the experimen-
tal design, such as the complexity of the duration distributions
(19; 23-25) or discriminability of the stimulus sets. Whether this
strategy provides any functional advantage is not yet clear. One
possibility is that the multi-dimensional nature of sensory input
heightens the chance of forming redundant prior representations
based on uninformative distinctions between stimulus character-
istics. Initially grouping prior experiences according to a smaller
set of goal-directed actions may be less problematic in this regard.
At present, our understanding of the neural substrates of
prior knowledge is limited. Priors specifying long-term structural
regularities in the environment have been suggested to be implic-
itly encoded in sensory representations, via inhomogeneities in
the number, distribution and/or bandwidth of tuning curves (7,
30) or patterns of spontaneous firing activity (31-32). In contrast,
recent functional neuroimaging results suggest that recently ac-
quired priors are represented in distinct brain regions to sensory
likelihoods (33). But why should actions be used to partition prior
knowledge of interval duration?
There is growing evidence indicating that the encoding of
temporal information relies upon brain areas that are involved
in motor control, most notably the basal ganglia, cerebellum and
supplementary motor area (SMA) (34-35). In many instances
there appears to be a tight coupling between sensory processing
and motor planning. For example, it has been proposed that the
SMA can be subdivided into two structurally and functionally
distinct areas: a rostrally located pre-SMA involved in encoding
of temporal structure and a more caudally positioned SMA-
proper, which uses this information to implement motor actions
(36). Interestingly, groups of neurons in SMA have been shown
to exhibit interval tuning that is invariant to sensory modality
(37) and activity that is action selective (38). Recruitment of
neuronal populations with similar properties during early prior
acquisition could potentially underlie the pattern of specificity
and generalisation found in the present study. To test this hypoth-
esis, future studies could take a similar approach to characterise
the selectivity of rapidly acquired priors in non-temporal tasks.
Central-tendency biases provide a particularly useful testbed for
examining these issues; robust effects have been reported across
a wide range of magnitude estimation tasks including length,
distance and loudness (16, 39).
If motor-specificity proves to be a general property of prior
acquisition in temporal and non-temporal domains, it would
imply broader integration of sensory analysis and motor con-
trol in the brain. In Bayesian models of magnitude estimation,
perceptual decision making and action planning are typically
implemented in serial stages: likelihoods and priors are first
combined to obtain a posterior probability distribution over the
possible states of the world; an estimate is then formed taking into
account the relative costs and benefits associated with alternative
choices; and finally an appropriate motor action is planned and
executed (17, 18, 20). However, an alternative suggestion is that
the brain continuously processes sensory information to specify
several potential actions in parallel (40-42). According to this
‘intentional’ framework of information processing, perceptual
decision making and motor planning are intrinsically linked. In
support of this view, activity consistent with accumulation of
evidence for a decision has been identified in a variety of neural
populations tuned for motor output parameters (42-43). More-
over, decision-related activity has been shown to occur in parallel
in areas associated with different motor responses (44-46). Motor
specificity could arise naturally if signals used to form and update
prior representations are distributed in a similar manner.
Materials and Methods
Observers.
A total of 27 observers participated in the study, comprising one of the
authors (NWR) and 26 participants who were naive to the speciﬁc purpose
of the experiments (age range 19-36). All had normal, or corrected visual
acuity and no history of hearing difﬁculties. 6-9 observers completed each
of the sub-experiments (see Table S4 for complete break down), collecting
a minimum of 140 trials per combination of duration distribution and
condition (total trials >30,000). All experiments were conducted with the
written consent of each observer and in accordance with the School of
Psychology Ethics Committee at the University of Nottingham.
Stimuli.
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Visual stimuli were isotropic Gaussian patches (sigma = 1 deg.) gener-
ated inMatlab using PsychoPhysics Toolbox extensions (47-48) and presented
on a linearised 22 inch NEC MultiSync FP1370 monitor (100Hz framerate,
47 cd/m2 background luminance). Viewing distance was ﬁxed via headrest
at 103cm at which 1 pixel subtended 1 arcmin of visual angle. In different
experiments visual stimuli were centered either at ﬁxation or 3.33 deg. to the
left or right of ﬁxation. Auditory stimuli were 500Hz tones with 5ms cosine
on and off ramps, generated at a sampling rate of 44.1KHz and presented
diotically via Sennheiser HD-265 headphones at approximately 60 dB SPL.
Procedure.
Stimulus durations were sampled from discrete log-uniform distribu-
tions, each comprising 7 levels. For the three distributions shown in Figure
1A, the median durations (i.e. 4th levels) were 320ms, 640ms and 1280ms
respectively and duration levels were each separated by 0.05 log units. For
Figure 1B the distributions were centered on 480ms and 960ms with a step
size of 0.1 log unit, and Figure 1C depicts a distribution centered on 640ms
with a 0.15 log unit step size. For blocked conditions, each of the 7 stimulus
durations were presented 10 times in a pseudo-random order.
For the experiments depicted in Figures 2-5, only the small step size
distributions (0.05 log units) centered on 320ms (short) and 1280ms (long)
were used. Interleaved sessions comprised 140 trials, 70 for each duration
range. The order of presentation was either pseudo-randomised (Figure 2A)
or else alternated from trial to trial (all other experiments). For all conditions,
the delay between a response and the presentation of the next stimulus was
jittered between 500ms and 1200ms. Observers were not informed as to the
nature of the duration distributions and no feedback was provided.
On manual reproduction trials, observers were instructed to press and
hold a button on the keyboard with their index ﬁnger to indicate the
perceived duration of the stimulus. Vocal reproduction was achieved by
asking observers to make vocalisations of the speech sound /ba/ which were
recorded using a Coles 4104 Ribbon Microphone. The duration of vocal
reproductions was extracted using an automated voice activity detection
algorithm from the VOICEBOX speech processing toolbox (49). On binary
discrimination trials, observers judged whether a stimulus was longer or
shorter than the mean duration seen at that location by pressing one of two
keyboard buttons (method of single stimuli, 50). To provide observers the
opportunity to build up a stable internal representation of the mean, the
ﬁrst seven trials consisted of one presentation of each of the duration level
in the set and responses from these trials were discarded.
Bayesian model.
To simulate patterns of reproduction bias, we assumed that observers
combine sensory estimates of stimulus duration with a learned approxi-
mation of the stimulus distribution. A full description of the model and
procedures for parameter setting can be found in Supporting Information.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by a Wellcome Trust Research Fellowship to
NWR (WT097387). We thank Thomas Veale for assisting with data collection.
1. Faisal, A. A., Selen, L. P. J., & Wolpert, D. M. (2008). Noise in the nervous system. Nat Rev
Neurosci, 9(4), 292–303.
2. Kersten, D., Mamassian, P., & Yuille, A. (2004). Object Perception as Bayesian Inference.
Ann Rev Psychol, 55(1), 271–304.
3. Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2004). The Bayesian brain: the role of uncertainty in neural coding
and computation. Trends Neurosci, 27(12), 712–719.
4. Körding, K. P., & Wolpert, D. M. (2004). Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning.
Nature, 427(6971), 244–247.
5. Seriès, P., & Seitz, A. R. (2013). Learning what to expect (in visual perception). Front Hum
Neurosci, 42, 2757-2772.
6. Körding, K. P., & Wolpert, D. M. (2006). Bayesian decision theory in sensorimotor control.
Trends Cogn Sci, 10(7), 319–326.
7. Girshick, A. R., Landy, M. S., & Simoncelli, E. P. (2011). Cardinal rules: visual orientation
perception reflects knowledge of environmental statistics. Nat Neurosci, 14(7), 926–932.
8. Weiss, Y., Simoncelli, E. P., & Adelson, E. H. (2002). Motion illusions as optimal percepts.
Nat Neurosci, 5(6), 598–604.
9. Adams, W. J., Graf, E. W., & Ernst, M. O. (2004). Experience can change the ‘light-from-
above’ prior. Nat Neurosci, 7(10), 1057–1058.
10. Miyazaki, M., Yamamoto, S., Uchida, S., & Kitazawa, S. (2006). Bayesian calibration of
simultaneity in tactile temporal order judgment. Nat Neurosci, 9(7), 875–877.
11. Tassinari, H., Hudson, T. E., & Landy, M. S. (2006). Combining priors and noisy visual cues
in a rapid pointing task. J Neurosci, 26(40), 10154–10163.
12. Chalk, M., Seitz, A. R., & Seriès, P. (2010). Rapidly learned stimulus expectations alter
perception of motion. J Vis, 10(8), 2:1-18.
13. Acerbi, L., Vijayakumar, S., & Wolpert, D. M. (2014). On the origins of suboptimality in
human probabilistic inference. PLOS Comp Biol, 10(6), e1003661.
14. Lejeune, H., & Wearden, J. H. (2009). Vierordt's The Experimental Study of the Time
Sense(1868) and its legacy. Eur J Cogn Psychol, 21(6), 941–960.
15. Vierordt, K. (1868). Der Zeitsinn nach Versuchen. Tubingen: Laupp.
16. Hollingworth, H. L. (1910). The central tendency of judgment. J Phil, Psychol Sci Meth, 7(17),
461–469.
17. Jazayeri, M., & Shadlen, M. N. (2010). Temporal context calibrates interval timing. Nat
Neurosci, 13(8), 1020-1026.
18. Cicchini, G.M., Arrighi, R., Cecchetti, L., Giusti, M., &Burr, D. C. (2012). Optimal encoding
of interval timing in expert percussionists. J Neurosci, 32(3), 1056–1060.
19. Acerbi, L., Wolpert, D. M., & Vijayakumar, S. (2012). Internal representations of temporal
statistics and feedback calibrate motor-sensory interval timing. PLOS Comp Biol, 8(11),
e1002771.
20. Petzschner, F. H., & Glasauer, S. (2011). Iterative Bayesian estimation as an explanation
for range and regression effects: a study on human path integration. J Neurosci, 31(47),
17220–17229.
21. Kwon, O.-S., & Knill, D. C. (2013). The brain uses adaptive internal models of scene statistics
for sensorimotor estimation and planning. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 110(11), E1064–73.
22. Verstynen, T., & Sabes, P. N. (2011). How each movement changes the next: an experimental
and theoretical study of fast adaptive priors in reaching. J Neurosci, 31(27), 10050–10059.
23. Berniker, M., Voss, M., & Körding, K. P. (2010). Learning priors for Bayesian computations
in the nervous system. PLoS ONE, 5(9): e12686.
24. Gekas, N., Chalk, M., Seitz, A. R., & Seriès, P. (2013). Complexity and specificity of
experimentally-induced expectations in motion perception. J Vision, 13(4), 8.
25. Sanborn, A. N., & Beierholm, U. R. (2016). Fast and Accurate Learning When Making
Discrete Numerical Estimates. PLOS Comp Biol, 12(4), e1004859.
26. Kerrigan, I. S., &Adams,W. J. (2013). Learning different light prior distributions for different
contexts. Cognition, 127(1), 99–104.
27. Nagai, Y., Suzuki, M., Miyazaki, M., & Kitazawa, S. (2012). Acquisition of multiple prior
distributions in tactile temporal order judgment. Front Psychol, 3, 276.
28. Petzschner, F. H., Maier, P., & Glasauer, S. (2012). Combining symbolic cues with sensory
input and prior experience in an iterative bayesian framework. Front Int Neurosci, 6, 58.
29. Sohn, H., & Lee, S. H. (2013). Dichotomy in perceptual learning of interval timing: calibra-
tion of mean accuracy and precision differ in specificity and time course. J Neurophys, 109(2),
344–362.
30. Wei, X.-X., & Stocker, A. A. (2015). A Bayesian observer model constrained by efficient
coding can explain “anti-Bayesian” percepts. Nat Neurosci, 18(10), 1509-1517.
31. Berkes, P., Orbán, G., Lengyel, M., & Fiser, J. (2011). Spontaneous cortical activity reveals
hallmarks of an optimal internal model of the environment. Science, 331(6013), 83–87.
32. Fiser, J., Berkes, P., Orbán, G., & Lengyel, M. (2010). Statistically optimal perception and
learning: from behavior to neural representations. Trends Cogn Sci, 14(3), 119–130.
33. Vilares, I., Howard, J. D., Fernandes, H. L., Gottfried, J. A., & Körding, K. P. (2012).
Differential representations of prior and likelihood uncertainty in the human brain. Curr
Biol, 22(18), 1641–1648.
34. Coull, J. T., Cheng, R.-K., & Meck, W. H. (2011). Neuroanatomical and neurochemical
substrates of timing. Neuropsychopharmacology, 36(1), 3–25.
35. Merchant, H., Harrington, D. L., & Meck, W. H. (2013). Neural basis of the perception and
estimation of time. Ann Rev Neurosci, 36(1), 313–336.
36. Kotz, S. A. E., & Schwartze, M. (2011). Differential input of the supplementary motor area
to a dedicated temporal processing network: functional and clinical implications. Front in Int
Neurosci, 5, 86.
37. Merchant, H., Pérez, O., Zarco,W.,&Gámez, J. (2013). Interval tuning in the primatemedial
premotor cortex as a general timing mechanism. J Neurosci, 33(21), 9082–9096.
38. Fujii, N., Mushiake, H., & Tanji, J. (2002). Distribution of eye- and arm-movement-related
neuronal activity in the SEF and in the SMA and Pre-SMAofmonkeys. J Neurophysiol, 87(4),
2158–2166.
39. Petzschner, F. H., Glasauer, S., & Stephan, K. E. (2015). A Bayesian perspective on magni-
tude estimation. Trends Cogn Sci, 19(5), 285–293.
40. Cisek, P. (2007). Cortical mechanisms of action selection: the affordance competition hy-
pothesis. Philos Trans R Soc of London B, Biol Sci, 362(1485), 1585–1599.
41. Shadlen,M.N., Kiani, R.,Hanks, T.D.,&Churchland,A.K. (2008). Neurobiology of decision
making: An intentional framework. In C. Engel & W. Singer (Eds.), Better than Conscious
Decision Making, the HumanMind, and Implications for Institutions (pp. 71–101). Cambridge,
MA.
42. Cisek, P., &Kalaska, J. F. (2010). Neuralmechanisms for interacting with a world full of action
choices. Ann Rev Neurosci, 33, 269-298.
43. Gold, J. I., & Shadlen, M. N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making. Ann Rev Neurosci,
30(1), 535–574.
44. Calton, J. L., Dickinson, A. R., & Snyder, L. H. (2002). Non-spatial, motor-specific activation
in posterior parietal cortex. Nat Neurosci, 5(6), 580–588.
45. Cui, H., & Andersen, R. A. (2007). Posterior parietal cortex encodes autonomously selected
motor plans. Neuron, 56(3), 552–559.
46. de Lafuente, V., Jazayeri, M., & Shadlen, M. N. (2015). Representation of accumulating
evidence for a decision in two parietal areas. J Neurosci, 35(10), 4306–4318.
47. Brainard, D. H. (1997). The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spat Vis, 10(4), 433–436.
48. Kleiner M, Brainard D, & Pelli D (2007) What's new in Psychtoolbox-3? Perception, 36
Supplement, 14.
49. Brookes, M. ed. VOICEBOX: Speech Processing Toolbox for MATLAB Available at: http://
www.ee.ic.ac.uk/hp/staff/dmb/voicebox/voicebox.html.
50. Morgan, M. J., Watamaniuk, S. N., & McKee, S. P. (2000). The use of an implicit standard
for measuring discrimination thresholds. Vision Res, 40(17), 2341–2349.
51. Gibbon, J. (1992). Ubiquity of scalar timing with a poisson clock. J Math Psychol, 35, 283-293.
52. Gibbon, J., Church, R. M., & Meck, W. H. (1984). Scalar timing in memory. Ann N Y Acad
Si, 423, 52–77.
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
6 www.pnas.org --- --- Footline Author
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
